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RESUMEN: Este articulo examina por que algunas democracias y semidemocracias desarrollan sistemas de partidos relativamente estables, mientras que otras continuan envueltas en altos niveles de volatilidad electoral. Este es el primer analisis amplio a nivel comparado regional cross-regional de volatilidad electoral, basado en la informacion mas extensa recolectada sobre el tema. Nuestro hallazgo mas original es que los regimenes competitivos inaugurados en periodos tempranos tienen mucha menos volatilidad electoral que aquellos inaugurados mas recientemente, incluso controlando una variedad de otros factores que se ha considerado que afectan la volatilidad electoral. Los partidos tenian funciones muy distintas segun el momento en que la democracia fue inaugurada y estas diferencias congenitas tuvieron efectos de largo plazo en la estabilizacion de la competencia partidista. Lo que importa en cuanto a la estabilizacion de la competencia es cuando la democracia nacio, no cuan antigua es. Nuestros resultados apoyan las aproximaciones de las ciencias sociales que enfatizan las secuencias historicas y el path dependency. ABSTRACT: This article examines why some democracies and semi-democracies develop relatively stable party systems, while others continue to be roiled by high levels of electoral volatility. It is the first broadly cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, and it is based on the most extensive data assembled on electoral volatility. Our most original finding is that competitive regimes inaugurated in earlier periods have much lower electoral volatility than regimes inaugurated more recently, even controlling for a variety of other factors that have been hypothesized to affect electoral volatility. Parties had very different functions according to when democracy was inaugurated, and these congenital differences had longterm effects on the stabilization of party competition. What matters for the stabilization of party competition is when democracy was born, not how old it is. Our results support social science approaches that emphasize historical sequences and path dependence.

Secuencias políticas y estabilización de la competencia partidista: volatilidad electoral en viejas y nuevas democracias