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Departing from the controversy between S. Haack and E. Bulygin about logic in the law, this paper discusses perspectives of using logical tools for modeling the activity of legal interpretation. It opposes two conceptions of law linking each to different logical representations: i) law as a system of rules linked to deontic logic and logic of belief/normative revision and ii) law as an interpretive/argumentative activity linked to logic of defeasible argumentation. Using a distinction between logics of qualification and logics of exception the paper then proposes a conciliation of both traditions sketching informally a way to integrate these logical tools. It defends a more optimistic view on logic in the law with greater expectations than that of Bulygin and with fewer delusions than those expressed by Haack.

La lógica en el Derecho: grandes expectativas y algunas desilusiones