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We present insights and empirical results from an extensive numerical studyof the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Fixationprobabilities for Moran processes are obtained for all pairs of 164 differentstrategies including classics such as TitForTat, zero determinant strategies,and many more sophisticated strategies. Players with long memories andsophisticated behaviours outperform many strategies that perform well in a twoplayer setting. Moreover we introduce several strategies trained withevolutionary algorithms to excel at the Moran process. These strategies areexcellent invaders and resistors of invasion and in some cases naturally evolvehandshaking mechanisms to resist invasion. The best invaders were those trainedto maximize total payoff while the best resistors invoke handshake mechanisms.This suggests that while maximizing individual payoff can lead to the evolutionof cooperation through invasion, the relatively weak invasion resistance ofpayoff maximizing strategies are not as evolutionarily stable as strategiesemploying handshake mechanisms.

plos one

Evolution Reinforces Cooperation with the Emergence of Self-Recognition  Mechanisms: an empirical study of the Moran process for the iterated  Prisoner's dilemma