English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominantindividuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate theinteraction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over acontested resource. We introduce three models to study the emergence andresilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, whenindividuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamicallydepend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies withhigher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restorescooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partnerchoice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in thenetwork and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. Whencompetitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cyclesof coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gainpopularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, andultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stableequilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperativeconvention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality iscompletely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic powerasymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannotbe isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose theirpower even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point thatmarks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This criticalpoint is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles startto emerge.

Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals