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† With apologies to Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Josh Rosenstein, Mike Shumsky, and Steven Wu for research assistance in the preparation of this article. The present text is a revision of an article first published as ‘Agency Statutory Interpretation’ in Philip Frickey, ed., Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002), online: Berkeley Electronic Press . 1 Perhaps the strongest statement of this is John Willis, ‘Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect’ (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225 [‘Retrospect’]. In other writings Willis sometimes characterized the usual approach as ‘conceptual’ – see John Willis, ‘Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional’ (1935) 1 U.T.L.J. 53 [ ‘Three Approaches’] – or ‘ideological,’ as in his famous send up of the McRuer Report: John Willis, ‘The McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ Values’ (1968) 18 U.T.L.J. 351 [‘Lawyers’ Values’]. 2 Willis, ‘Retrospect,’ supra note 1 at 227.

Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise