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A number of disparate approaches to language, ranging from cognitive linguistics to stochastic implementations of optimality theory, have challenged the classical distinction between knowledge of language and use of language. Supporters of such approaches point to the functional motivation of grammatical structure, language users' sensitivity to the frequency of occurrence of grammatical elements, and the great disparity between sentences that grammars generate and speakers' actual utterances. In this article I defend the classical position, and provide evidence from a number of sources that speakers mentally represent full grammatical structure, however fragmentary their utterances might be. The article also questions the relevance of most corpus-based frequency and probability studies to models of individual grammatical competence. I propose a scenario for the origins and evolution of language that helps to explain why grammar and usage are as distinct as they are.* 1. INTRODUCTION. My goal in this article is to argue in favor of the classical Saussur- ean position with respect to the relationship between knowledge of language and use of language. That is, the article provides evidence in support of the idea that the mental grammar contributes to language use, but that usage, frequency, and so on are not represented in the grammar itself. To do so, I necessarily take a wide-ranging approach, describing current anti-Saussurean USAGE-BASED MODELS and attempting to account for their popularity, and then defending the classical position with arguments based on the compatibility of formal grammar and functional explanation, the failure of connection- ism to provide an alternative to formal grammar, and the fact that speakers mentally represent full argument structure. Further, I argue that the mental grammar is only one of many systems that drive usage, since grammars are not actually well designed to meet language users' 'needs'. I explore as well the relevance for the main theme of the article the fact that grammatical change is syntagmatic, rather than paradigmatic. An argument against stochastic grammars is presented and one against the idea that grammars are fragile temporary objects. Finally, I propose an evolutionary scenario that makes sense of the grammar-use distinction. 2. USAGE-BASED MODELS OF GRAMMAR. The late 1960s witnessed the birth of the approach to grammar called GENERATIVE SEMANTICS. This approach promised to revolu- tionize the field of transformational generative grammar, itself barely a decade old at the time. With each passing year, generative semanticists declared that some seemingly well-established boundary was nothing but an illusion. The framework began in 1967, when George Lakoff and John R. Ross challenged the existence of the level of Deep Structure, and with it the boundary between syntax and semantics (Lakoff & Ross 1967/1976). The following year McCawley (1968) argued that syntactic and lexical

Grammar is Grammar and Usage is Usage