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On 15 January 1923, a high-ranking Soviet delegation traveled to Urus-Martan, the biggest aul (village) of Chechnya. The purpose was to inform the population that the Soviet government had granted the Chechens an autonomous region (avtonomnaia oblast'). (1) Originally, the meeting was to be held in Groznyi, which was not an administrative part of the new Chechen region, but where the newly established Revolutionary Committee (revkom), the provisional government of Chechnya, had its seat. If the larger population was to become acquainted with Soviet power, however, the news had to be conveyed outside the confines of Groznyi, a city living largely on its oil industry and inhabited mostly by Russians, to the auls of the Chechen populated countryside. (2) The Soviet delegation was led by Anastas Mikoian, head of the Southeastern Bureau, the North Caucasus office of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party located in Rostov-on-Don. The delegation included Kliment Voroshilov, a member of the bureau and commander of the North Caucasus Military Region, as well as two of his deputies, Semen Budennyi and Mikhail Levandovskii. Also joining the Soviet delegates was Tashtemir ETdarkhanov (1870-1934), one of the few indigenous Chechen Communists and head of the Chechen revkom, and several other members of the Chechen government. Although the Soviet delegates considered a journey to Chechnya a risky undertaking, they did not want to appear as a hostile power and thus refrained from bringing a military escort. They were, however, accompanied by two military bands whose musicians apparently had weapons hidden under their coats. (3) Some 2,000-3,000 riders on horseback accompanied the delegates on the last section of their journey to Urus-Martan, where they were greeted by some 10,000 people, including inhabitants of Urus-Martan as well as representatives from different Chechen auls. (4) The large number of village elders and religious figures among them gave the Soviet delegates a friendly welcome. After the Bolsheviks and the Chechen representatives held their speeches, the village elders managed to convince their guests not to return to Groznyi but to stay overnight. (5) The atmosphere during the evening was festive, dances and plays were organized, and Budennyi, who according to Mikoian had already made a most favorable impression on the Chechens during his speech, successfully performed the lezginka, the traditional dance of the mountaineer peoples of the Caucasus. (6) Although the meeting with the Chechens was largely harmonious, the world the Bolsheviks encountered was far from their liking. According to Voroshilov, who described his impressions in a letter to Stalin on 21 January 1923, the "Chechens were no better or worse than other mountaineers [gortsy]," yet they had more "mullahs, sheikhs, and other devilry [chertovshchina] than others--for example, the Karachai and even the Kabardian peoples," and their "fanaticism, backwardness, and ignorance [were] extraordinary." (7) Voroshilov was convinced that a socialist transformation of "mullah-dominated Chechnya" would eventually become possible, but only once the Bolsheviks were able to rely on a "cadre of efficient and loyal party workers." As long as this was not the case, he saw no other option than to cooperate with "mullahs and similar such gentlemen [mully i prochie gospoda]." (8) To be sure, he also greatly disliked El'darkhanov, whom he described as a "spineless, weak-minded, stupid, and arrogant old geezer." (9) This attitude was typical among leading Bolsheviks toward indigenous local Communists, whom they often regarded as too lenient and inclined to compromise and thus not likely to enforce radical changes. Yet Voroshilov acknowledged that for the time being, there simply was no alternative. (10) The Bolsheviks' readiness to cooperate with Muslims and thereby to accept, at least for the time being, the existence of sharia courts, Islamic schools, or Islamic charitable endowments (waqf), did not reflect a tolerant mindset. …

Uneasy Alliances: Bolshevik Co-optation Policy and the Case of Chechen Sheikh Ali Mitaev