English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Logical relativism is the claim that different cultures may think according to\uddifferent logical laws. For example, it is often argued that whereas ‘we’ (Westerners)\udoperate according to the law of the excluded middle, ‘they’ (e.g., the Chinese or the\udAzande) may not. In this article, we question whether logical relativism is an empirical\udthesis, i.e., a thesis that is substantiated through anthropological examples.\udWe distinguish two forms of logical relativism, both of which try to account for alleged\udcontradictions in the beliefs of other cultures. The ‘alternative logic’ approach suggests\udthat contradictions only appear if we judge beliefs according to classical logic, but do not\udexist if we judge them according to an alternative (non-standard) logic. The ‘symmetric\udtreatment’ suggests that whether there is a contradiction or not is itself a culture-specific\udmatter, such that what may be a contradiction ‘for them’ may not be a contradiction ‘for\udus’ and vice versa. We question whether either of these arguments really involves\udrelativism and show that problems arise in the treatment of the examples, firstly, in terms\udof questionable preconceptions made about the status of logic as a standard of\udcomparison and, secondly, in the ways in which relevant beliefs are formulated

Logical Relativism: Logic, Grammar, and Arithmetic in Cultural Comparison