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DOI 10.12957/rqi.2013.9315 Trabalho recebido e avaliado pelo Conselho executivo da Revista Quaestio Iuris RESUMO : O presente artigo pretende expor a complexidade do debate contemporâneo sobre a dificuldade contramajoritaria, mas nao para examinar as inumeras respostas que a teoria constitucional e a filosofia politica vem dando a esta questao. O objetivo do artigo e apresentar duas ideias que, se adotadas, podem minimizar a chamada "dificuldade majoritaria" da jurisdicao constitucional: (a) a adocao de uma teoria de dialogos constitucionais, que negue tanto a Corte Constitucional como aos poderes politicos majoritarios a prerrogativa de dar a “ultima palavra” sobre o significado das normas constitucionais; e (b) a definicao de diferentes standards de deferencia do Poder Judiciario no exercicio do controle de constitucionalidade, em face de atos ou omissoes dos outros poderes, que sejam sensiveis ao principio democratico. PALAVRAS-CHAVE : Dificuldade contramajoritaria. Jurisdicao constitucional. Teoria de dialogos constitucionais. Poder Judiciario. Controle de constitucionalidade. Standards de deferencia. Principio democratico. ABSTRACT : This article seeks to expose the complexity of the contemporary debate on difficulty against majority, but not to examine the numerous responses that constitutional theory and political philosophy are giving for this issue. The objective of this paper is to present two ideas that, if adopted, may minimize called "majoritarian difficulty" of constitutional jurisdiction: (a) the adoption of a theory of constitutional dialogue, which denies both the Constitutional Court and the majority political powers the prerogative to give the "last word" on the meaning of constitutional norms; and (b) establishing different standards of deference the Judiciary in the exercise of judicial review, in the face of acts or omissions of the other powers, which are sensitive to the democratic principle. KEYWORDS : Difficulty against majority. Constitutional jurisdiction. Theory of constitutional dialogue. Judiciary power. Control of constitutionality. Standards of deference. Democratic principle.

revista quaestio iuris/quaestio iuris

Notas sobre jurisdição constitucional e democracia: a questão da "última palavra" e alguns parâmetros de autocontenção judicial / Notes on jurisdiction and constitutional democracy: thequestion of the "last word" and some parameters of judicialself-...