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DOI: 10.12957/dep.2016.26505 Abstract Market regulation is generally regarded as a technocratic exercise, one which consists of ensuring that the rules and practices of market being regulated correspond as much as possible to those of an objective ideal-type often referred to as a 'perfect' market.  The institutional manifestation of this believe is the 'independent regulatory agency', a particular kind of market regulator which is supposed to be shielded from 'political' forces in order to allow it to pursue its objective economic mandate undisturbed by corrupting forces of politics.  This article shows that in fact, market regulation can never be completely reduced to a technocratic exercise.  Market regulation invariably and inescapably demands political bargaining and political forms of decisionmaking.  This is because in fact, there is not simply one ideal of the 'perfect' market ideal but multiple ideals for various kinds of perfect markets.  Each of these different ideas contribute something necessary to the state.  Moreover, their respective contributions are incommensurate -- loss of one cannot be meaningfully 'compensated' for by increase in some other.  They have to be balanced, not optimized, and this can only be done through politics Keywords: market regulation; competition law; variegated capitalismo. Resumo A regulacao do mercado e geralmente considerada um exercicio tecnocratico, de garantir que as regras e praticas de mercado reguladas correspondam, na maior medida possivel, a um tipo ideal objetivo frequentemente referido como um mercado “perfeito”. A manifestacao institucional dessa crenca e a “agencia regulatoria independente”, uma especie particular de regulador de mercado que  se supoe protegido de forcas “politicas” para permitir que cumpra seu mandato economico sem ser incomodado pelas forcas corruptoras das politica. Este artigo mostra como, na verdade, a regulacao do mercado jamais pode ser completamente reduzida a um exercicio tecnocratico. A regulacao do mercado inevitavelmente e inescapavelmente demanda negociacao e formas de tomada de decisao politicas. Isso ocorre porque nao ha apenas um ideal de mercado “perfeito”, mas multiplos ideais para varios tipos de mercados perfeitos. Cada uma dessas diferentes ideias traz contribuicoes necessarias ao Estado. Alem disso, as suas respectivas contribuicoes sao incomensuraveis – a perda de uma nao pode ser significativamente “compensada” pelo aumento de outra. Elas precisam ser equilibradas, nao otimizadas, e isso so pode ser feito por meio da politica. Palavras-chave: regulacao do mercado; direito da concorrencia; capitalismo matizado.

On the Innately Political Character of Market Regulation / Sobre o caráter político inato da regulação do mercado