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This paper analyzes a variation of the secretary problem in which two selectors with different fields of interest each want to appoint one of the n candidates with as much expertise as possible in their field. Selectors simultaneously vote to accept or reject: Unanimous decisions are respected, and candidates with a split decision are hired with probability p. Each candidate arrives with expertise x and y in the two fields, uniformly and independently distributed on [0, 1] and observable to both selectors. If a candidate with expertise pair (x, y) is hired by unanimous decision, the payoffs to the selectors are simply x and y. However, to model the level of conformity in the firm, we deduct a positive “consensus cost” c from the utility of a selector who has rejected a candidate who is nevertheless hired. We show (Theorem 1) that each stage game has a unique equilibrium in which there are two thresholds, z v or x > z and y > v. We show that for suffi...

The Secretary Problem with a Selection Committee: Do Conformist Committees Hire Better Secretaries?