Open AccessStrategy Consensus for a Class of Random Evolutionary Games
Author(s) -
Xueying Ding,
Yingrui Zhou,
Lu Liu,
Haitao Li
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
destech transactions on engineering and technology research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2475-885X
DOI - 10.12783/dtetr/iceea2016/6683
Subject(s) - class (philosophy) , product (mathematics) , algebraic number , computer science , tensor product , mathematics , mathematical optimization , theoretical computer science , mathematical economics , artificial intelligence , pure mathematics , geometry , mathematical analysis
This paper studies the strategy consensus for a class of random evolutionary games, that is, random evolutionary Boolean games (REBG), by using the semi-tensor product of matrices. The RBEG is converted into an algebraic form, based on which, a necessary and sufficient condition is presented to check the strategy consensus for REBG. A numerical example is worked out to illustrate the efficiency of the obtained results.
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