English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

This paper is an addendum to (Tsohatzidis, 2013). K eywords: self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositional- ity; natural language semantics It has occurred to me that some of my comments on the linguistic exam- ples presented in "Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth" (Tsohatzidis, 2013) might appear puzzling to some readers, since, a lthough the examples were tacitly assumed in the paper to be under- stood as occurring in speech, they are of course presented in writing. Remote as it may be, the possibility of misunderstanding on this score would have been prevented by choosing, in the wording of the examples, a verb that, unlike the verb 'utter' and its synonyms, is interpreted in a way that is neutral between the spoken and the written medium. In the inter-linguistic kind of case discussed in the paper, appropriate medium-neutral examples of sentences that have the same meaning but cannot have the same truth conditions would be sentences such as (a) and (b) below: (a) The sentence hereby produced is an example of an English sentence. (b) Der hiermit erzeugte Satz ist ein Beispiel eines englischen Satzes. In the intra-linguistic kind of case discussed in the paper, appropriate medium-neutral examples of sentences that have the same meaning but cannot have the same truth conditions would be sentences such as (c) and (d):

Addendum to “Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth”