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In this article the notion of “logical consistency” in the sense introduced by Field in [Field 1991] is discussed. Field argues, that it is possible to introduce the notion of “logical consistency” as a primitive metalogical notion, which is independent from model-theoretical and proof-theoretical notions. In this article I want to indicate some difficulties of this standpoint, and to identify some hidden presuppositions. I also would like to show, that introducing this concept (at least in the form considered by Field) does not really support Field’s argumentation against realism. I confine myself to the analysis of Field’s standpoint, and will not discuss the more general issue, whether it is possible to treat the notion of “logical consequence” as a primitive notion.

Some remarks on Hartry Field's notion of “logical consistency”