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Desenvolvendo a analise regulatoria nas agencias independentes Each year, independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission—issue highly consequential regulations. When they issue their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for analysis that apply to other agencies. Consequently, courts, policymakers, and scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies. These agencies’ track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar concerns. In this article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current quality and offering possible solutions Congress could adopt to improve these agencies’ regulatory analysis. I present three options for improving prospective analysis by independent agencies: continuing to allow courts to encourage better analysis; subjecting independent agencies to the same White House review that currently applies to executive agencies; and amending the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) to impose a requirement for analysis but not White House review. The UMRA option would best balance the desire to improve prospective regulatory analysis at independent agencies with prevailing norms of autonomy that surround these agencies. In addition to improving prospective analysis, independent agencies should seek to produce more rigorous retrospective analysis of their existing regulations, both to improve the substantive performance of their existing regulations and to learn better what to expect when analyzing new regulations. I thus offer options for improving retrospective analysis by independent agencies, each of which could be adopted without undermining autonomy norms. Ultimately, to see independent regulatory agencies better fulfill their public missions, their leaders must make still smarter regulatory decisions—and the first step toward smarter decisions is to improve regulatory analysis. A cada ano, agencias reguladoras independentes — como a Comissao Federal de Comunicacoes, a Comissao Reguladora Nuclear e a Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios — emitem regulamentacoes altamente pretenciosas. Quando elas emitem suas regulamentacoes, no entanto, elas nao precisam atender aos mesmos requisitos de analise que se aplicam a outras agencias. Consequentemente, tribunais, formuladores de politicas e academicos expressaram serias advertencias sobre uma falta geral de analise prospectiva de alta qualidade de novas regulamentacoes em agencias independentes. Os registros dessas agencias com analises retrospectivas de suas regulamentacoes existentes levantam preocupacoes semelhantes. Neste artigo, abordo a qualidade da analise regulatoria nas agencias independentes como um problema politico, avaliando a qualidade atual e oferecendo as possiveis solucoes que o Congresso poderia adotar para melhorar a analise regulatoria dessas agencias. Apresento tres opcoes para aprimorar a analise prospectiva por agencias independentes: continuar a permitir que os tribunais incentivem uma melhor analise; submeter agencias independentes a mesma revisao da Casa Branca, que atualmente se aplica as agencias executivas; e alterar o Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) para impor um requisito de analise, mas nao a revisao da Casa Branca. A ultima opcao e a que melhor equilibraria o desejo de desenvolver a analise prospectiva das agencias independentes com normas vigentes de autonomia que cercam essas agencias. Alem de melhorar a analise prospectiva, as agencias independentes devem procurar produzir uma analise retrospectiva mais rigorosa de suas regulamentacoes existentes, tanto para melhorar o desempenho substantivo de seus regulamentos existentes quanto para aprender melhor o que esperar ao analisar novas regulamentacoes. Assim, ofereco opcoes para melhorar a analise retrospectiva de agencias independentes, cada uma das quais poderia ser adotada sem prejudicar as normas de autonomia. Por fim, para que as agencias reguladoras independentes cumpram melhor suas missoes publicas, seus lideres devem tomar decisoes regulatorias ainda mais inteligentes — e o primeiro passo em direcao a decisoes mais inteligentes e melhorar a analise regulatoria.

Improving regulatory analysis at independent agencies