English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians(Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed twogeneral conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in anytwo-person zero-sum repeated game, the asymptotic value exists, and the secondone is that, when Player 1 is more informed than Player 2, in the long runPlayer 1 is able to guarantee the asymptotic value. We disprove these twolong-standing conjectures by providing an example of a zero-sum repeated gamewith public signals and perfect observation of the actions, where the value ofthe $\lambda$-discounted game does not converge when $\lambda$ goes to 0. Theaforementioned example involves seven states, two actions and two signals foreach player. Remarkably, players observe the payoffs, and play in turn.

Zero-sum repeated games: Counterexamples to the existence of the asymptotic value and the conjecture $\operatorname{maxmin}=\operatorname{lim}v_n$