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The emergence and maintenance of cooperation has attracted intensivescholarly interest and has been analysed within the framework of evolutionarygame theory. The role of innovation, which introduces novel strategies into thepopulation, is a relatively understudied aspect of evolutionary game theory.Here, we investigate the effects of two sources of innovation---mutation andheterogeneous updating rules. These mechanisms allow agents to adopt strategiesthat do not rely on the imitation of other individuals. The modelintroduces---in addition to canonical imitation-based strategyupdating---aspiration-based updating, whereby agents switch their strategy byreferring solely to the performance of their own strategy; mutation alsointroduces novel strategies into the population. Our simulation results showthat the introduction of aspiration-based rules into a population of imitatorsleads to the deterioration of cooperation. In addition, mutation, incombination with heterogeneous updating rules, also diminishes cooperators.This phenomenon is prominent when a large proportion of the population consistsof imitators rather than adopters of aspiration-based updating. Nevertheless, ahigh mutation rate, in combination with a low aspiration level, has positivenonlinear effects, and a heterogeneous population achieves a higher level ofcooperation than the weighted average of homogeneous populations. Our resultsdemonstrate the profound role of innovation in the evolution of cooperation.

Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games