English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Various social dilemma games that follow different strategy updating ruleshave been studied on many networks.The reported results span the entirespectrum, from significantly boosting,to marginally affecting,to seriouslydecreasing the level of cooperation.Experimental results that are qualitativelydifferent from theoretical prediction have also been reported.It is widelybelieved that the results are largely determined by three elements,includingpayoff matrices of the underlying 2*2 games,the way that the strategic statesof the players are updated and the structure of the networks.Here we discussthe impact of a seemly non-essential mechanism -- what we refer to as a "payoffscheme". Specifically, in each round after the states of all of the players aredetermined,the payoff scheme is how each player's payoff is calculated.Inaddition to the two conventions in which either the accumulated or the averagedpayoff is calculated from playing with all of the neighboring players,we herestudy the effects of calculating the payoff from pairing up with one randomplayer from among the neighboring players. Based on probability theory, in asituation of uncorrelated events, the average payoff that involves all of theneighbors should,in principal,be equivalent to the payoff from pairing up withone neighbor.However,our simulation of games on graphs shows that, in manycases,the two payoff schemes lead to qualitatively different levels ofcooperation.This finding appears to provide a possible explanation for a widespectrum of observed behaviors in the literature.We have also observed thatresults from the randomly-pairing-one mechanism are more robust than theinvolving-all-neighbours mechanism because,in the former case, neither theother three main elements nor the initial states of the players have a largeimpact on the final level of cooperation compared with in the latter case.

Games on graphs: A minor modification of payoff scheme makes a big difference