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In support of the Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) safety case for a geological disposal facility (GDF) in the UK, there is a regulatory requirement to consider the likelihood and consequences of nuclear criticality. Waste packages are designed to ensure that criticality is not possible during the transport and operational phases of a GDF and for a significant period post-closure. However, over longer post-closure timescales, conditions in the GDF will evolve. For waste packages containing spent fuel, it can be shown that, under certain conditions, package flooding could result in a type of criticality event referred to as 'quasi-steady-state' (QSS). Although unlikely, this defines a 'what-if' scenario for understanding the potential consequences of post-closure criticality. This paper provides an overview of a methodology to understand QSS criticality and its application to a spent fuel waste package. The power of such a hypothetical criticality event is typically estimated to be a few kilowatts: comparable with international studies of similar systems and the decay heat for which waste packages are designed. This work has built confidence in the methodology and supports RWM's demonstration that post-closure criticality is not a significant concern.

Consequence modelling of hypothetical post-closure criticality events for spent fuel disposal