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The article analyses the application of the spitzenkandidaten procedure as instances of a larger institution building process in which the European Parliament and the European Council try to enact competing rules. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new clause on how to appoint the Commission President. While in 2014 the European Parliament successfully realised its interpretation according to which the winning spitzenkandidat became Commission President, in 2019 the Council succeeded in deciding not only who would take the Commission presidency but also other key positions. We consider both appointments as cases of decision-making in a natural arena that lack stable institutions about how to appoint the Commission president. Accordingly, the single decisions pended on the case-specific strategic use of resources. While the analysis of the two single cases does not allow us to predict what the institutional rules for future appointments will be, we can identify key resources and strategies that will determine how the institutional rules will be shaped in the elections to come and thus further the understanding of the institutionalisation in the making.

(Un)settling the precedent: Contrasting institutionalisation dynamics in the spitzenkandidaten procedure of 2014 and 2019