One Europe, One Vote?
Author(s) -
Jeffry Frieden
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
european union politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.241
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1741-2757
pISSN - 1465-1165
DOI - 10.1177/1465116504042441
Subject(s) - pooling , compromise , european union , representation (politics) , foreign policy , political science , politics , position (finance) , member states , international trade , political economy , public economics , economics , law , computer science , artificial intelligence , finance
Many Europeans support common European Union (EU) representation in international institutions. But such a pooling of international political influence raises complex and controversial issues. A common European foreign policy position implies compromise among EU members. The pooling of international representation thus requires, as with many internal EU policies, that member states weigh the potential benefits of a common policy against the potential costs of a policy not to their liking. There can be a tradeoff between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences. Simple spatial models help to make this point, to clarify the circumstances in which a common European international representation is most likely, and to explain who is most likely to support or oppose a pooling of European foreign policies.
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