Six Challenges for Embodiment Research

Twenty years after Barsalou’s seminal perceptual-symbols article, embodied cognition , the notion that cognition involves simulations of sensory, motor, or affective states, has moved from an outlandish proposal to a mainstream position adopted by many researchers in the psychological and cognitive sciences (and neurosciences). Though it has generated productive work in the cognitive sciences as a whole, it has had a particularly strong impact on research into language comprehension. The view of a mental lexicon based on symbolic word representations, which are arbitrarily linked to sensory aspects of their referents, was generally accepted since the cognitive revolution in the 1950s. This has radically changed. Given the current status of embodiment as a main theory of cognition, it is somewhat surprising that a close look at the literature reveals that the debate about the nature of the processes involved in language comprehension is far from settled, and key questions remain unanswered. We present several suggestions for a productive way forward.