What the Future Holds and When: A Description–Experience Gap in Intertemporal Choice
Author(s) -
Dai Junyi,
Pachur Thorsten,
Pleskac Timothy J.,
Hertwig Ralph
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
psychological science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.641
H-Index - 260
eISSN - 1467-9280
pISSN - 0956-7976
DOI - 10.1177/0956797619858969
Subject(s) - lottery , weighting , intertemporal choice , psychology , generality , outcome (game theory) , preference , probabilistic logic , rare events , cumulative prospect theory , econometrics , cognitive psychology , social psychology , statistics , economics , mathematical economics , mathematics , psychotherapist , medicine , radiology
Uncertainty about the waiting time before obtaining an outcome is integral to intertemporal choice. Here, we showed that people express different time preferences depending on how they learn about this temporal uncertainty. In two studies, people chose between pairs of options: one with a single, sure delay and the other involving multiple, probabilistic delays (a lottery). The probability of each delay occurring either was explicitly described ( timing risk ) or could be learned through experiential sampling ( timing uncertainty ; the delay itself was not experienced). When the shorter delay was rare, people preferred the lottery more often when it was described than when it was experienced. When the longer delay was rare, this pattern was reversed. Modeling analyses suggested that underexperiencing rare delays and different patterns of probability weighting contribute to this description–experience gap. Our results challenge traditional models of intertemporal choice with temporal uncertainty as well as the generality of inverse-S-shaped probability weighting in such choice.
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