When It’s an Error to Mirror

Mimicry and imitation can facilitate cultural learning, maintenance of culture, and group cohesion (Churchland, 2011; Kashima, 2008; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Tomasello, 1999). However, to obtain these benefits, individuals must competently select the appropriate models and actions to imitate (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Mesoudi, 2009). Mimicry and imitation also play an important role in dyadic social interactions (Bernieri, 1988; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). People mimic their partners’ mannerisms, which increases rapport and the partners’ liking of the mimickers; indeed, mimicry has been dubbed a form of “social glue” (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Although such dyadic mimicry is often unconscious, it is also selective and moderated by attitudes, liking, affiliation goals, and social membership; people may reduce their mimicry or even engage in antimimicry when interacting with a partner who represents an out-group, who has different goals, or whom they do not like well (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Likowski, Muehlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008; McIntosh, 2006; Stel et al., 2010). Previous research has focused primarily on mimicry effects within the interacting dyad. Real-world social behavior, however, often occurs in the presence of other individuals. In that sense, mimicry is socially situated (Semin & Cacioppo, 2008). Dyadic mimicry can be observed by third-parties, and these observers can use it to form judgments about the interacting partners. As a result, such judgments may influence mimics’ social reputations. With these considerations in mind, we asked whether mimicry unconsciously influences evaluations made by third-party observers. Critically, we predicted that observers would be sensitive to the appropriateness of individuals’ mimicry. Our reasoning was that just as a competent learner will select the appropriate individuals and actions to imitate, a competent interaction participant will discriminate, often nondeliberatively, when to mimic and whom to mimic. Conversely, an incompetent individual may be indiscriminate or injudicious in his or her mimicry. An individual’s selection of whom to mimic therefore has the potential to serve as a valuable source of information about that individual’s characteristics. In particular, observers could judge people as less competent if they mimic the wrong individual than if they do not mimic that individual. As a result, mimicry may have reputational costs that at times make not mimicking one’s partner a superior social strategy. To examine this possibility, we had subjects observe interactions in which individuals either did or did not mimic cordial or unfriendly models. We predicted that even without conscious awareness of mimicry, third-party observers would evaluate individuals who mimicked an unfriendly model as less competent than individuals who mimicked a cordial model. More important, we predicted the counterintuitive effect that mimicry would actually be costly—specifically, that people who mimicked an unfriendly model would be viewed as less competent than those who did not mimic that model.