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This article explores the connections between planning and land rent through a case study of density bonusing in Toronto, known as ‘Section 37’ – a form of land value capture. Density bonusing facilitates speculative bidding on future rents by private developers seeking ‘highest and best’ land uses – or efficient land uses – yet has implications related to equity when the unearned increment is extracted to recover value and invest in public goods. We situate land value capture within debates on the unearned income derived from land development in cities. We view the case of density bonusing through the lens of discretionary planning systems operating through flexible mechanisms. Specifically, we consider the direct role of planners towards balancing private interests with public goods in the face of shifting market and political contexts. The findings show that securing public goods from private land development through the unearned increment lacks consistency and predictability when the flexibility exercised by development actors drives planning decision-making. We conclude with a discussion on the implications for discretionary planning and land value capture in market-intensive, neoliberal environments.

Balancing equity-based goals with market-driven forces in land development: The case of density bonusing in Toronto