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Local government innovation diffusion in China: an event history analysis of a performance-based reform programme, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Volume 84, Number 1, March 2018, pp.63–81, DOI 10.1177/0020852315596211    A number of references to an article by Jiaqi Liang and Laura Langbein (2015) Performance management, high-powered incentives, and environmental policies in China. International Public Management Journal 18(3): pp.346–385 were omitted from the article. The following corrections apply. Due to errors by SAGE the article was corrected online but not in the print issue. The French and Chinese issues were corrected.    Pages 66–67    China's centralised authoritarian regime is characterised by a monopolistic personnel management mechanism, the nomenklatura (Burns, 1987, 1994; Chan, 2004; Kung and Chen, 2011), which originated in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc communist countries (Manion, 1985; Liang and Langbein, 2015 ). The Department of Organisation of the CCP established and institutionalised China's contemporary cadre management system in 1979 (Chow, 1988; Liang and Langbein, 2015 ).    Page 67    Under the Chinese nomenklatura system, cadre positions are divided into different ranks; members of the CCP Politburo have the highest ranking. The appointment, promotion, transfer or removal of any important party or state leader requires the approval of the party committee controlling the nomenklatura under which that leader's office is listed (Manion, 1985). Subordinate leading bureaucrats (i.e. party secretaries and government chiefs) are hierarchically accountable to the level of government immediately above, which exercises nomenklatura authority and makes personnel decisions about leadership positions (Edin, 2003; Liang and Langbein, 2015 ). Officials' personal performance records are used by their superiors to make decisions about appointments, transfer, removal, promotions, demotions and merit-based pay of bureaucrats, especially those in leadership positions ( Liang and Langbein, 2015 ).    Political ambitions are the paramount motivations of individuals in the bureaucracy governed by the nomenklatura system in China, and career-oriented leading cadres desire to advance up the ladder of power and authority in the system (Liang and Langbein, 2015). It follows that the administrative behaviour of lower-tier bureaucrats who wish to advance will reflect the policy preferences of their hierarchical superiors making nomenklatura personnel decisions ( Liang and Langbein, 2015 ).    Page 68    In addition, bureaucrats in different positions have different incentives under China’s nomenklatura mechanism. Top-level bureaucrats, who are already at the pinnacle of power and authority, have little incentive to pursue actions that are tied to career prospects; the marginal rewards they received for political and economic achievement diminish and the time value of additional rewards is lower due to their greater age (Liang and Langbein, 2015). Research has found that lower-level, alternate members of the Central Committee of the CCP have much stronger incentives to pursue political radicalism than full members (full members have the second-highest political rank and Politburo members have the highest) (Kung and Chen, 2011).    Page 69    Not only did cadres’ differences in the position of authority lead to different estimates of political career prospects which can influence cadres’ enthusiasm for pursuing policy agendas (Kung and Chen, 2011; Liang and Langbein, 2015), but leaders working in different provinces can also have distinct prospects of political promotion despite their similar positions. Under the Chinese nomenklatura system, the Politburo lies on the top (Burns, 1987, 1994; Chan, 2004; Kung and Chen, 2011). Though regional representation in the Central Committee of the CCP is becoming increasingly balanced, politicians from more powerful provinces such as Beijing and Shanghai are more likely to become Politburo members than those from other provinces ( Liang and Langbein, 2015 ).    Page 71    Independent variables. Relative age, Politburo incumbency, distance to the general election and chance of appointment to the Politburo are all coded according to provincial secretaries’ archives or the Chinese political cycle. A leader’s relative age is the difference between the year of the next NCCCP and the year of his birth as age in the year of the next general election is an important factor affecting a politician’s promotion. (A similar index was developed in Liang and Langbein, 2015).    Furthermore, we develop an index to estimate the historical likelihood of promotion to the Politburo for each province which is calculated using the Politburo membership representation from 1997 (the 15th NCCCP) to 2007 (the 17th NCCCP). For each NCCCP, one province gets one point for an incumbent Politburo member who was working or was working as the party secretary, governor or both. We measure this variable with the average score per NCCCP for each province. (A similar index was developed in Liang and Langbein, 2015 ).