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This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.Diversity has been blamed for poor public goods provision in a number of\uddifferent contexts. It is associated with reduced spending on services, meager\udrates of tax collection, and poor policies. I argue in this article, however, that\udin semidemocratic or authoritarian countries, where political parties are weak,\uddiversity can be an important source of electoral competition, leading to better\udservices. In diverse communities where multiple identity groups are politically\udmobilized, candidates are forced to seek the support of voters outside of their\udgroup, who are more likely to vote based on qualifications than on group affiliation,\udresulting in better public officials who provide superior services. Moreover, I\udfind internal group fragmentation to be important in understanding the impact\udof heterogeneity on public goods provision: Candidates in areas where only\udone identity group is politically mobilized but where that group is politically\udfragmented will also seek votes from other groups within the community similar\udto candidates in locations with “multigroup” mobilization, leading to improved\udpublic goods provision. These arguments are confirmed through the analysis of\udtribal mobilization and public goods across Jordan’s municipalities

Tribal Mobilization, Fragmented Groups, and Public Goods Provision in Jordan