English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Freedom does not come for free. And any decisions taken to improve our economy must not lead us into a different sort of crisis - a security crisis.Anders F. Rasmussen* 1IntroductionThe economic growth generated by the globalization of the world economy over the past several decades has supported the rise of emerging powers. This in turn is leading to an expected change in the international system, giving rise to theories of a multipolar or a polycentric world, with higher interdependencies and multiple poles of power. Nevertheless, the consequences of the global financial crisis are currently challenging these theories and forecasts. At the transatlantic level, the combination of several trendssuch as continuously shrinking defense budgets and declining public and political interest in NATO on both sides of the Atlantic, and a greater strategic emphasis in the U.S. on the Asia-Pacific region-could affect the United States' level of engagement in Europe and, consequently, in Europe's security.Europe would find itself in a weak spot, facing difficulties in dealing with the possible (military, humanitarian, etc.) crises in its neighborhood, at least in the short to medium term. Yet Europe holds at least some of the right cards in order to remain a relevant actor in the future, based on its economy, internal structure, and functioning; it is well positioned to play an important role at the international and multinational level. In order to achieve this future state, Europe must dedicate thought and resources. The continuation and deepening of the transatlantic relation-even if not on an exclusive footing-would be a natural response to the challenges of the twenty-first century, and would prove beneficial to both sides of the Atlantic.The Emerging Twenty-First Century Security Environment: From Unipolarity to Multipolarity?The end of World War II marked the beginning of a relatively stable international system, with two great powers-the United States and the Soviet Union-dominating global economic, political, and military affairs. With the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the U.S. survived as the world's only superpower, and the world entered the unipolar era. Yet, as Jan Andersson notes, "Nevertheless, some twenty years later, military overextension and reckless economic policies have weakened the U.S to the point where it is unable to maintain its dominant role in international affairs."2VisionsAt this point, there are several perspectives on potential future states for the world system: the world could be entering a new phase, with higher interdependencies and multiple poles or centers of power, becoming multipolar or polycentric. The economic growth generated by the globalization of the economy has supported the rise of developing powers-the BRICS3 and others-which is expected to lead to a change in the international system. The forecasts for the world of 2030 are founded on this trend of power diffusion among countries of the world.4 On the other hand, several authors speak of an age of apolarity, an anarchic world (Niall Ferguson, Zbigniew Brzezinski), or even of "another Great American Century" (Richard Haass).Numerous studies focus on the rise of the Asia-Pacific region in the balance of world economics and political power, stating, for instance, that Europe and North America combined will be surpassed "in terms of power (calculated from GDP, population, defense spending, investments in technology) by 2030, if not earlier. Not only Europe and the United States are projected to decline, but so are Japan and Russia."5 Following the relative economic success of the rising powers, and also miscalculations, mistakes, and weaknesses from the U.S. side, the world would consist of no hegemon, but rather several powers (U.S., China, India, Brazil, Russia, even South Africa-and, optimistically, the EU), accompanied by middle-tier regional powers such as Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc. …

The Transatlantic Relation in Times of Multipolarity: European Security Implications