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The difficulty in penetrating Islamist extremist terrorist cells provided the impetus behind the “Routes Project,” which is the focus of this issue of Connections. Terrorist cells, particularly those of Al Qaeda and like-minded groups, are difficult to penetrate for a number of reasons. First, Al Qaeda cells are usually well financed, and thus are not susceptible to bribery as a mechanism for gaining access. Second, Al Qaeda training methods prevent those who have not graduated from Al Qaeda camps or other modes of instruction from entering a cell’s inner circle. They do not have the correct bona fides and do not know the “secret handshake” that would ensure their trustworthiness. Third, “Al Qaeda is held together by bonds of friendship, kinship, and discipleship,” according to Nick Pratt of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. A person can speak the language, look the part, and know the culture, but if he remains an outsider and is not “known” by other Al Qaeda members, he will not be accepted. Fourth, Al Qaeda’s complicated cellular structure makes it difficult to effectively penetrate the organization. Its cells operate independently, and each cell leader knows only the person above him in the organization. In addition, one cell leader may command several groups, using one alias with one group and another with a different group, so that captured members of different cells will give interrogators different names. Finally, Islamist terrorist cells do not respond to Cold War-era cell penetration tactics. Bribery (mentioned previously) does not work, nor do drugs, alcohol, or sexual entrapment—penetration mainstays of the competition between the Soviet bloc and the West during the Cold War. The hypothesis of this project is simple: if terrorist cells resist direct penetration, the next best thing is to take an indirect approach by infiltrating groups that associate and interact with terrorist groups. Thus, the researchers involved in the “Routes Project” examined the linkages between and among terrorist groups and criminal cartels that traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. More specifically, identifying the nexus where terrorist groups converge was deemed most important. The following assumptions helped frame the project’s research:

The Routes of Terrorism and Trafficking from Central Asia to Western Europe