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There could scarcely be a more appropriate time than the present to address the issue of oversight of security and intelligence services. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the Iraq war, and the bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2001, many of those responsible for overseeing intelligence in both the legislative and the executive branches of government are currently involved in investigating the intelligence services and the way political leaders use or misuse the intelligence they receive. The U.S. 9/11 Commission 1 and the U.K. Butler Commission, to mention just two inquiries, have dealt with formidable questions indeed: Are intelligence officials working effectively and within the rule of law? Do political leaders politicize intelligence? Do intelligence services need additional legal powers and resources in order to deal with terrorist threats? These and other questions illustrate that the process of intelligence oversight has two important goals in democratic societies: keeping the services in line with their legally defined mandate and ensuring their effectiveness. In this article the focus is on comparing legislative oversight practices in selected democratic states, with the goal of making recommendations for strengthening intelligence oversight. A focus on strengthening oversight is necessary because the changed security climate since 9/11 has underlined the need to balance our commitments to security and democracy. This can only be achieved if the new powers that have been granted to the intelligence services are accompanied by enhanced intelligence oversight.

Towards Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services: Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices