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Based on recent political events and an analysis of a range of articles by German experts in the field of global politics, this essay will define the main preconditions for the deterioration of American–German relations in the early 2000s. From there, it will go on to outline the most probable scenarios for the further developments in the political interaction of these nations. One of the most salient issues of modern European and transatlantic politics is the development of relations between the United States and Germany. During the postWorld War II years, these states were the closest allies, a relationship that allowed the successful containment of Soviet pressure against Western Europe. The well-known words of President J.F. Kennedy—“Ich bin ein Berliner”—which were spoken in June 1963 (two years after the construction of the Berlin Wall) can be looked to as the slogan of the American–German partnership in the sphere of defense and security in the following decades. It is necessary also to emphasize a key role of the U.S. during the process of German unification. The consistent position of the first President Bush, who supported the Federal Republic of Germany’s plan to gradually incorporate the GDR into the FRG, helped convince Mikhail Gorbachev to agree with this approach. If the position of the former American president had not been as firm, the Soviet Union could have proposed the slowest speed of integration possible, and thus have created a de facto longterm conservation of the pro-Soviet regime in East Germany. Therefore, Helmut Kohl, the former Chancellor of Germany, has characterized his American colleague as “a great stroke of luck for us Germans” (“ein grosser Glucksfall fur uns Deutsche”). A result of such close cooperation between the U.S. and Germany in 1989–90 was the rebuilding of the united German state, its further full membership in NATO, and the strengthening of the German role in the system of European and transatlantic security more generally. Moreover, in the 1990s Washington successfully promoted the return of a united Germany to major-power status in international politics, a nation able to actively participate in peacekeeping operations around the world. After the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the High Constitutional Court of Germany) to permit the Bundeswehr to participate in peacekeeping missions out of the area of NATO responsibility in July 1994, soldiers of the Bundeswehr took part in such missions as

The American–German Partnership in the Early Twenty-First Century: A New Challenge