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PELLICANI, A. D., Investment decisions of Brazilian firms: asymmetric information, agency problems and investment opportunities, 130 p., Thesis (PhD’s degree) – Engineering School of São Carlos, University of São Paulo, São Carlos, 2015. This study investigates the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a sample of 356 Brazilian listed firms on the period of 1997-2010, considering the ownership and control structure. Firms are grouped into underinvestment and overinvestment, and re-classified according to industrial investment opportunities. Using a version of the accelerator investment model, estimated by the System GMM, the results show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity may indicate asymmetric information, investment opportunities and agency problems of free cash flow. Specifically, it is discussed that the overinvestment may be signaling high investment opportunities or agency problems of free cash flow. The purpose of this study is also investigate whether family control, pyramidal ownership structure, and pyramidal controlled by families (pyramidal-family firms) can influence the level of internal capital used to finance investments. The results show that the investment of underinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may be not sensitive to cash flow when the excess of control rights over cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is lower. However, for overinvestment firms with low industrial investment opportunities, the family control and pyramidal-family may intensify the investment-cash flow sensitivity when the excess of control rights is high. For lower levels of excess of control rights, the results support that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity of overinvestment firms with high industrial investment opportunities may signal profitability potential of family firms. As an additional analysis, it is also investigated whether the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the excess of control rights is non-linear. The results confirm the non-linearity of this relationship, except to pyramidal-family firms into the overinvestment group with low industrial investment opportunities.

Decisões de investimento das firmas brasileiras: assimetria de informação, problemas de agência e oportunidades de investimento