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Speculative execution attacks undermine the security of constant-timeprogramming, the standard technique used to prevent microarchitectural sidechannels in security-sensitive software such as cryptographic code.Constant-time code must therefore also deploy a defense against speculativeexecution attacks to prevent leakage of secret data stored in memory or theprocessor registers. Unfortunately, contemporary defenses, such as speculativeload hardening (SLH), can only satisfy this strong security guarantee at a veryhigh performance cost.  This paper proposes DECLASSIFLOW, a static program analysis and protectionframework to efficiently protect constant-time code from speculative leakage.DECLASSIFLOW models "attacker knowledge" -- data which is inherentlytransmitted (or, implicitly declassified) by the code's non-speculativeexecution -- and statically removes protection on such data from points in theprogram where it is already guaranteed to leak non-speculatively. Overall,DECLASSIFLOW ensures that data which never leaks during the non-speculativeexecution does not leak during speculative execution, but with lower overheadthan conservative protections like SLH.

DECLASSIFLOW: A Static Analysis for Modeling Non-Speculative Knowledge to Relax Speculative Execution Security Measures (Full Version)