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Cryptographic algorithm agility is an important property for DNSSEC: itallows easy deployment of new algorithms if the existing ones are no longersecure. In this work we show that the cryptographic agility in DNSSEC, althoughcritical for provisioning DNS with strong cryptography, also introduces avulnerability. We find that under certain conditions, when new algorithms arelisted in signed DNS responses, the resolvers do not validate DNSSEC. As aresult, domains that deploy new ciphers may in fact cause the resolvers not tovalidate DNSSEC. We exploit this to develop DNSSEC-downgrade attacks andexperimentally and ethically evaluate them against popular DNS resolverimplementations, public DNS providers, and DNS services used by web clientsworldwide. We find that major DNS providers as well as 45% of DNS resolversused by web clients are vulnerable to our attacks.

Poster: The Unintended Consequences of Algorithm Agility in DNSSEC