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In this paper, we shed new light on the DNS amplification ecosystem, bystudying complementary data sources, bolstered by orthogonal methodologies.First, we introduce a passive attack detection method for the Internet core,i.e., at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs). Surprisingly, IXPs and honeypotsobserve mostly disjoint sets of attacks: 96% of IXP-inferred attacks wereinvisible to a sizable honeypot platform. Second, we assess the effectivenessof observed DNS attacks by studying IXP traces jointly with diverse data fromindependent measurement infrastructures. We find that attackers efficientlydetect new reflectors and purposefully rotate between them. At the same time,we reveal that attackers are a small step away from bringing aboutsignificantly higher amplification factors (14x). Third, we identify andfingerprint a major attack entity by studying patterns in attack traces. Weshow that this entity dominates the DNS amplification ecosystem by carrying out59% of the attacks, and provide an in-depth analysis of its behavior over time.Finally, our results reveal that operators of various .gov names do not adhereto DNSSEC key rollover best practices, which exacerbates amplificationpotential. We can verifiably connect this operational behavior to misuses andattacker decision-making.

The Far Side of DNS Amplification: Tracing the DDoS Attack Ecosystem from the Internet Core