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Onion addresses encode their own public key. They are thusself-authenticating, one of the security and privacy advantages of onionservices, which are typically accessed via Tor Browser. Because of the mostlyrandom-looking appearance of onion addresses, a number of onion discoverymechanisms have been created to permit routing to an onion address associatedwith a more meaningful URL, such as a registered domain name.  We describe novel vulnerabilities engendered by onion discovery mechanismsrecently introduced by Tor Browser that facilitate hijack and tracking of userconnections. We also recall previously known hijack and trackingvulnerabilities engendered by use of alternative services that are facilitatedand rendered harder to detect if the alternative service is at an onionaddress.  Self-authenticating traditional addresses (SATAs) are valid DNS addresses orURLs that also contain a commitment to an onion public key. We describe how theuse of SATAs in onion discovery counters these vulnerabilities. SATAs alsoexpand the value of onion discovery by facilitating self-authenticated accessfrom browsers that do not connect to services via the Tor network.

Attacks on Onion Discovery and Remedies via Self-Authenticating Traditional Addresses