English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Boot firmware, like UEFI-compliant firmware, has been the target of numerousattacks, giving the attacker control over the entire system while beingundetected. The measured boot mechanism of a computer platform ensures itsintegrity by using cryptographic measurements to detect such attacks. This istypically performed by relying on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Recent work,however, shows that vendors do not respect the specifications that have beendevised to ensure the integrity of the firmware's loading process. As a result,attackers may bypass such measurement mechanisms and successfully load amodified firmware image while remaining unnoticed. In this paper we introduceBootKeeper, a static analysis approach verifying a set of key securityproperties on boot firmware images before deployment, to ensure the integrityof the measured boot process. We evaluate BootKeeper against several attacks oncommon boot firmware implementations and demonstrate its applicability.

BootKeeper: Validating Software Integrity Properties on Boot Firmware Images