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Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to informationleakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior ofa benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested byincremental software patches for the RSA algorithm against variants ofside-channel attacks within different versions of cryptographic libraries,protecting security-critical algorithms against side channels is an intricatetask. Software protections avoid leakages by operating in constant time with auniform resource usage pattern independent of the processed secret. In thisrespect, automated testing and verification of software binaries forleakage-free behavior is of importance, particularly when the source code isnot available. In this work, we propose a novel technique based on DynamicBinary Instrumentation and Mutual Information Analysis to efficiently locateand quantify memory based and control-flow based microarchitectural leakages.We develop a software framework named \tool~for side-channel analysis ofbinaries which can be extended to support new classes of leakage. For the firsttime, by utilizing \tool, we perform rigorous leakage analysis of twowidely-used closed-source cryptographic libraries: \emph{Intel IPP} and\emph{Microsoft CNG}. We analyze $15$ different cryptographic implementationsconsisting of $112$ million instructions in about $105$ minutes of CPU time. Bylocating previously unknown leakages in hardened implementations, our resultssuggest that \tool~can efficiently find microarchitectural leakages in softwarebinaries.

MicroWalk: A Framework for Finding Side Channels in Binaries