Open AccessThe output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection
Author(s) -
Arthur Carvalho,
Stanko Dimitrov,
Kate Larson
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
acm sigecom exchanges
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1551-9031
DOI - 10.1145/2692375.2692384
Subject(s) - crowdsourcing , projection (relational algebra) , payment , variety (cybernetics) , computer science , simple (philosophy) , private information retrieval , function (biology) , social choice theory , agreement , econometrics , microeconomics , psychology , social psychology , mathematical economics , economics , artificial intelligence , algorithm , computer security , world wide web , philosophy , linguistics , epistemology , evolutionary biology , biology
The output-agreement method has been successfully used to reward agents in a variety of crowdsourcing settings. This method consists of a simple payment function that randomly matches two agents' reported information and rewards agreement. In this letter, we discuss how the output-agreement method might induce honest behavior when there exists social projection, i.e., when each agent believes that his private information is the most popular one amongst his peers.
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