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Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain why, in public goods games, cooperation does not collapse. In these games free-riders enjoy the benefits of other individuals who contribute in benefit of a community. In the present work we address a public goods game where individuals have the choice between contributing to a sanctioning institution and to a sanction-free one. In the former there is a possible sanction for those who do not contribute. Our results show that individuals who contribute to a sanctioning institution are better off after several repetitions of the game, despite the costs associated with sanctioning. This reproduces results found in experiments with human subjects, which point to advantages of sanctioning measures as a factor for the stabilization of cooperation.

Simulating the effects of sanctioning for the emergence of cooperation in a public goods game