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We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrarynumber, n, of firms. We show that the n-1 last movers delegate their productiondecisions to managers whereas the first mover does not. Equilibrium incentiverates are increasing in the order with which managers select quantities.Letting u_i^* denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager moves inthe i-th place, we show that u_n^*>u_{n-1}^*>...>u_2^*>u_1^*. We also comparethe delegation outcome of our game with that of a Cournot oligopoly and showthat the late (early) moving firms choose higher (lower) incentive rates thanthe Cournot firms.

Strategic delegation in a sequential model with multiple stages