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We consider a dominant upstream firm selling an input to several downstream firms through observable, non-discriminatory two-part tariff contracts. Downstream firms can alternatively buy the input from a less efficient source of supply. In this setting, we analyze the relationship between the competitive effects of downstream mergers and the level of concentration at the upstream level. We show that a downstream merger leads to lower wholesale prices. This translates into lower final prices only when the upstream market is sufficiently concentrated. In this case, a downstream merger tends to be both procompetitive and profitable.Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación and FEDER funds under project SEJ 2007-62656, from Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad under project ECO2012-34928 and the IVIE is gratefully acknowledged

WELFARE EFFECTS OF DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND UPSTREAM MARKET CONCENTRATION