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The author analyzes in detail the circumstances of the April Revolution in Afghanistan, believing that it was a coup carried out by revolutionary-minded officers of the Afghan army in spring 1987, which predetermined the subsequent entry of Soviet troops in 1979. This event, as the author argues, was completely unexpected not only for the Soviet leadership, but also for the USSR Embassy in Kabul. Relations between the USSR and former Afghan leadership were quite successful. Neither the USSR embassy nor Soviet advisers in various state structures provided assistance to the rebels. However, the course proclaimed by the new leaders of Afghanistan, N.-M. Taraki and Amin towards building socialism, demonstrative orientation towards the USSR, and reliance on its support in combating political opponents turned the Soviet Union into a forced ally of the government led by the PDPA. D.B. Ryurikov explores the gradual escalation of the Soviet–American conflict. In his opinion, a mixture of truthful information and seemingly plausible “bogus stories” from various sources, which led Soviet decision-making bodies to military intervention, assessed the situation and its prospects as very difficult, which led to the entry of a limited Soviet army contingent into Afghanistan.

On the History of the Entry of Soviet Troops into Afghanistan. Commentary