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The aim of the study is to verify the extent to which Brazilian regional governments opportunistically manipulate the budgetary results in the reporting of small balances, and whether the electoral cycles and the fiscal responsibility laws are incentives for this practice. Through a cross-regional analysis, we researched the case of the Brazilian regional governments (n=27), during a longitudinal period from 1989 to 2014, totaling 702 observations. The main discoveries indicate that governments tend to be involved in the manipulation of budgetary results, that is, they disclose small budgetary balances close to zero. Also, note that the electoral cycle has no conclusive effects on this practice; at the same time, the governments have incentives to respond positively to the rules of the fiscal responsibility law.

Evidencias de manipulación de resultados presupuestarios en el sector público: análisis cross-subnational para el Brasil