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Due to severe congestion before the Three Gorges Dam, roll-on/roll-off and container carriers are encouraged to adopt water-land transshipment mode. Owing to high transit and road costs, however, carriers are reluctant to adopt this mode. In this paper, we study the spatial-temporal relationship between the transshipment mode and the transshipment cost. Furthermore, we analyze the feasibility of subsidy strategies with regards to water-land transshipment from the standpoint of the government. An evolutionary game theory model is used to identify the equilibrium points of transshipment and non-transshipment, as well as subsidy and non-subsidy strategies available to carriers and the government, respectively, under different scenarios. With a transshipment job for a major carrier as an example, freight prices offered by carriers and subsidies provided by the government under water-road and water-road-water modes are analyzed, with the aim of providing strategic input for both the government and the carriers.

Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Study Behavioral Strategies of the Government and Carriers Under Different Transshipment Modes