English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goodsgame contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment ischallenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latterimplies that non-cooperators punish cooperators, while the former impliesunwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here we extend the theory ofcooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competingstrategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well ascooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We showthat if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based onnetwork reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter publiccooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment isactively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does actdetrimental, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs arerelatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial patternformation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and arethus effectively second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment, form anactive layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them againstdefectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that issustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible viathe same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionaryoutcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determinethe stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikelyevolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and theyprovide a rationale for why second-order freeriding is not always an impedimentto the evolutionary stability of punishment.

Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment