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Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumedjust to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resourcelimitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner'sdilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditionalcooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of aself-organizing process that turns the interaction payoff matrix intoevolutionary neutral, and represents a resource-based control mechanismpreventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is the first exampleof coexistence in well-mixed populations with a game structure different from asnowdrift game.

Coexistence of cooperators and defectors in well mixed populations mediated by limiting resources