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The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is alargely unexplored question in collective social phenomena. Whetherindividuals' decisions are taken in a pure strategic basis or due to socialpressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome.Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which decisions are made eitherbased on the replication of the most successful neighbor's strategy(unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update ruleinspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter dynamics are anenhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generallyuniform, and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameterspace as compared to the outcome of purely strategic updates. Thus, voterdynamics acts as an interface noise and has a similar effect to a pure randomnoise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the networkheterogeneity. When strategic decisions are made following other update rulessuch as the replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found underunconditional imitation for some parameters disappears, but an increase ofcooperation in certain parameter regions is still observed. Comparing ourresults with recent experiments on the Prisoner's Dilemma, we conclude thatsuch a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among theagents.

Social imitation vs strategic choice, or consensus vs cooperation in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma