English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergenceand sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirectreciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base theirdecisions on their opponent's reputation gained in past interactions with otherplayers (moral assessment). The combination of actions and moral assessmentleads to a large diversity of strategies, thus determining the stability of anyof them against invasions by all the others is a difficult task. We use avariant of a previously introduced reputation-based model that let ussystematically analyze all these invasions and determine which ones aresuccessful. Accordingly we are able to identify the third-order strategies(those which, apart from the action, judge considering both the reputation ofthe donor and that of the recipient) that are evolutionarily stable. Ourresults reveal that if a strategy resists the invasion of any other one sharingits same moral assessment, it can resist the invasion of any other strategy.However, if actions are not always witnessed, cheaters (i.e., individuals witha probability of defecting regardless of the opponent's reputation) have achance to defeat the stable strategies for some choices of the probabilities ofcheating and of being witnessed. Remarkably, by analyzing this issue withadaptive dynamics we find that whether a honest population resists the invasionof cheaters is determined by a Hamilton-like rule---with the probability thatthe cheat is discovered playing the role of the relatedness parameter.

Evolutionary stability and resistance to cheating in an indirect reciprocity model based on reputation