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We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs andscale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of betterperforming players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy asthe two emotions that determine the strategy of each player by any giveninteraction, and we define them as probabilities to cooperate with playershaving a lower and higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a populationwhere all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, theevolutionary process leads to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotionalprofile that is eventually adopted by all players. However, this emotionalprofile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of theinteraction network. Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular randomgraphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by high sympathy and highenvy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also lowenvy. Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity tocooperate at large depend, and are in fact determined by the properties of theinteraction network.

Evolution of emotions on networks leads to the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas